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evidence that Buccino's predecessors withheld such rights, Ace had, as
a matter of law, the right to use Hall's pond for recreational purposes.
Regan Rozier

City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002)
(holding exhausting administrative remedies is unnecessary to a
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act claim and finding
unreasonable public trust impairment must be consistent with
Connecticut Environmental Protection Act statutory scheme)
City of Waterbury ("Waterbury") appealed the Connecticut
Superior Court's declaratory judgment for the Town of Washington
("Washington"), which held that Waterbury's Shepaug dam operation
violated the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA")
because it polluted the public trust, but not by becoming a public or
private nuisance. The trial court found alleged excessive diversions
interfered with the Washington's riparian rights, breaching the parties'
1921 contract. On appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the
Washington cross-claimed for injunctive relief, alleging the diversions
unreasonably impaired the public trust, and that relief granted could
not cure Waterbury's breach. The supreme court reversed and held
that: (1) exhausting administrative remedies was unnecessary to a
CEPA claim; (2) the trial court's unreasonable impairment finding was
incorrect because it did not consider minimum flow statutes as within
CEPA's mandate; and (3) Waterbury established a prescriptive
easement against the Washington's riparian rights. On remand, the
court must consider CEPA, public trust and riparian rights claims, as
well as a new remedy for the contractual claim.
A 1921 contract permitted Waterbury to divert, out of the Shepaug
River, only amounts necessary for consumption and storage.
Diversions were unlawful when reservoirs were full. When Waterbury
built a treatment plant in 1988, a reservoir, from which it did not draw,
frequently overflowed.
Waterbury also incurred increased costs
pumping water uphill to "high-service areas," allegedly with a greater
impact on natural resources than necessary. Over-reliance on Shepaug
dam diversions resulted, though other reservoirs overflowed.
Waterbury claimed an 1893 agreement allowed these diversions if
in accord with minimum flow statutes, and therefore also in accord
with CEPA. It challenged the trial court's unreasonable impairment
definition, contending that only administrative agencies have
jurisdiction to determine whether minimum flow statutes are within
CEPA's scope.
CEPA, however, did not require exhausting
administrative remedies because the requirement was neither
statutorily explicit nor implicit. Its legislative history contemplated
administrative relief prior to trial, with judicial discretion over whether
to retain the case or refer it to the agency. The trial court therefore

Issue I

COURT REPORTS

properly had subject matter jurisdiction. Cases requiring exhausting
administrative remedies were overruled.
Further, the trial court's unreasonable impairment definition as
"something more than de minimus," would force defendants to claim
lack of alternatives as a sole affirmative defense. CEPA compliance
instead determines the proper standard. Because minimum flow
statutes were not designed solely to protect fish and wildlife, they were
proper factors in establishing unreasonable impairment, consistent
with CEPA's statutory scheme.
Waterbury further established a prescriptive easement against
Washington. Waterbury's conduct was sufficiently open and visible for
the statutory period to give the Washington notice that flow
diminished by diversions adverse to the Washington's rights. The
easement's scope however, was for the trial court to determine on
remand, with reference to the 1893 and 1921 agreements. The trial
court's remedy was inadequate because it was based on a faulty,
unreasonable impairment definition and denied relief for Waterbury's
contractual breach.
Robert Lykos
Grannis Island Co., Inc. v. City of New Haven, No. CV000445887S,
2002 WL 230912 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2002) (affirming a city
planning commission's denial of a proposed regrade plan because the
petitioner did not support the plan with sufficient evidence and the
plan was inconsistent with the Connecticut Coastal Management Act).
Grannis Island Co. ("Grannis") owned property in New Haven,
bordered by tidal wetlands and property owned by New Haven Land
Trust ("NHLT").
Previously, the New Haven Water Authority
("NHWA") owned the adjacent property where Grannis stored
construction materials. Subsequently, NHWA conveyed their property
to NHLT. Upon acquiring ownership, NHLT requested Grannis
remove the stored materials from their property. Consequently,
Grannis decided to "regrade and fill 4.6 acres of upland on [its]
property" in order to store their construction materials. To attain
permission for the regrade, Grannis applied to the New Haven City
Plan Commission ("Commission") for a coastal site plan review and a
soil and erosion control permit. After a hearing, the Commission
denied Grannis' application. Grannis appealed the application denial
to the Superior Court of Connecticut.
At issue before the court was whether the record supported the
Commission's decision to deny Grannis' application. The court
affirmed the Commission's decision based on the following factors: (1)
there was insufficient evidence regarding the spatial relationship
between the proposed regrade and the tidal wetlands border; (2) the
description of the regrade plan was insufficient; (3) Grannis failed to

